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bstract
The aim of this paper is to explore a parallelism between two episodes in the history of economic thought in order to suggest that
he interaction between them can contribute to the research on Kaleckian growth and distribution models. First, a brief summary of
he theoretical development from Steindl’s stagnationist claims to the debate about demand regimes is offered. Then, a more detailed
ccount is provided of the Latin American debate that began with Furtado’s stagnationist claims and resulted in the formulation of
odels of social articulation and disarticulation. Finally, an analytical classification of Kaleckian and Latin American growth and
istribution models is provided, indicating the way in which sectoral heterogeneity and demand composition can act as a plausible
ink between growth and distribution.
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This paper has as its starting point two episodes in the history of economic thought that show an interesting
arallelism. Both began with forecasts that ended up being unambiguously inaccurate. More concretely, they were both
nitiated by claims that economic growth had its days counted and stagnation was unavoidable. Ironically, these claims
ere made in the run-up to periods of extraordinarily high growth. However, these failed predictions pointed towards
ome illuminating characteristics of capitalist economies that would be the basis of later theoretical elaborations, which
ucceeded in keeping the useful insights while shedding away the mistaken forecast.
The first of these episodes is well known. It began with Josef Steindl’s (1952/1976) stagnationist argument and
ventually led to the debate on demand and growth regimes, based on Kaleckian growth and distribution models (see
lecker, 2002, for a summary). The second, relatively more obscure, is a Latin American version of the first one. It
egan with stagnationist views of the prospects of Latin American development (see, for instance, Furtado, 1965), was
ollowed by a revisionist attempt to interpret the failed prediction (most famously by Tavares and Serra, 1971/1976) andE-mail address: rugitsky@usp.br
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resulted in the formulation of models of social articulation or disarticulation, that is, of cumulative processes involving
growth and inequality (Taylor and Bacha, 1976; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1983).1
By exploring this parallelism, this paper aims to provide a classification of Kaleckian and Latin American growth
and distribution models that goes beyond the one based on a conventional understanding of the demand and distribu-
tive schedules (Taylor, 2010: 188). Examining the way in which sectoral heterogeneity can be incorporated in this
framework and the cumulative processes that it may generate, this analysis points towards an additional mechanism
connecting growth and distribution that may be important to interpret particular historical developments, but that is
largely overlooked by the Kaleckian literature, despite notable exceptions (Taylor, 1989; Dutt, 1990b: chaps. 6–7). Even
if abstracting from these issues might be adequate in certain cases, a reinterpretation of the demand and distributive
schedules that incorporates sectoral heterogeneity (both in the production and in the consumption dimensions) can
contribute to the attempts to understand the dynamic interaction between growth and distribution.
1.  From  stagnationist  claims  to  demand  regimes:  the  Kaleckian  thread
With hindsight, it seems incredible that in the aftermath of World War II there was widespread concern with a
potential economic stagnation of the rich countries (or “mature economies,” as they were then called). After all, the
following two decades would be characterized by an extraordinary prosperity and would be called the “golden age” of
capitalism (Armstrong et al., 1984/1991). But the economic troubles that plagued Europe after World War I were still
too recent to be ignored and averting their repetition was a widely shared objective.
Steindl’s (1952/1976) Maturity  and  Stagnation  in  American  Capitalism  is a product of this context. Its character-
ization of postwar capitalism did not sink into oblivion, in spite of the ensuing “golden age,” surviving in a branch
of Marxism initiated by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy’s Monopoly  Capital  (1966). Steindl’s argument is the postwar
version of a much older underconsumptionist tradition. According to him, in a competitive economy, if the growth
rate and capacity utilization decreased, competitive pressure would ensure that the less efficient producers would be
eliminated by the more efficient ones in a price war that tended to diminish the average profit margins (Steindl, 1979:
5–8). These reduced margins would, in their turn, stimulate the resumption of growth and the recovery of the capacity
utilization ratio. However, in an oligopolistic economy this stabilization mechanism would no longer work, because
profit margins become rigid, and a deceleration of growth would not face any countervailing force. As a result, stag-
nation could become permanent. But why does increasing concentration make the profit margins rigid? In Steindl’s
(1979: 7) words, in an oligopolistic economy “aggressive price strategies become very risky, because the few main
producers all have substantial margins, and to drive out one of them would require a ruinous price war. If the growth
rate declines, the oligopolists are therefore more prepared in most cases to accept low long-term rates of utilization
than to engage in cut-throat competition.”2
Commenting Steindl’s and Baran and Sweezy’s arguments, Robert Brenner (1998/2006: 54) claims that “[t]he
notions of ‘monopoly capital’ and ‘capitalist stagnation’ soon revealed themselves (.  . .) to be reification of quite
temporary and specific aspects of the economy of the US in the 1950s.” Steindl (1979: 8–13) himself had defended
his argument against this kind of criticism, claiming that the growth rates observed in the 1950s and 1960s did not
contradict his interpretation, since they could be explained by resorting to other factors. And, since the 1970s, the
tendency towards stagnation could once more be clearly identified, according to him.
Relatively apart from this controversy, in the early 1980s the Kaleckian framework that was the basis for Steindl’s
argument would be combined with an adaptation of Steindl’s own ideas about capacity utilization and the investment
function to formulate the early versions of what is now called Kaleckian growth and distribution models (Rowthorn,
1981, Dutt, 1984, Taylor, 1985).3 The objective was no longer to provide an epochal diagnosis of capitalism, but rather
to give a mathematical representation of the relationship between growth and the functional distribution of income,
that might be useful to throw light on concrete economic developments (Amitava Dutt’s paper addresses an episode
1 The connection between the Kaleckian models and the Latin American literature has also been suggested by Taylor and Arida (1988/1998:
166-168).
2 See, also, Steindl (1952/1976: chap. 5) and Lee (1999: 186-197).
3 The original versions were developed independently by Rowthorn and Dutt. Taylor was Dutt’s advisor at MIT and the latter’s 1984 paper is
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f economic deceleration in India, for instance). Moreover, while Kalecki and Steindl put a lot of emphasis on the
heoretical understanding of cyclical dynamics, the 1980s literature was based on more simple steady state analyses.
Lance Taylor (1985) called his model “stagnationist,” but the label was only a sign of its Steindlian heritage. The
odel did result in a positive relation between the wage share and aggregate demand, but he did not argue that there
as a secular tendency to a reduction of the wage share and, consequently, to stagnation, in contrast to Steindl. This
ositive relation had an affinity with social democrat and Keynesian inclinations to argue for the compatibility between
rowth and income redistribution.4 But, in the mid-1980s, with the neoliberal backlash under way, these ideas were
osing favor.
A few years later, Amit Bhaduri and Stephen Marglin (1990) used a more general model to show that the mentioned
ositive relation was just one possibility among others (something that had also been suggested by Robert Blecker,
989). The novelty of Bhaduri and Marglin’s work was not to show that there could be an inverse relationship between
he wage share and growth, since this was a common view, shared by most classical economists and by the Cambridge
eynesians. Their contribution was simply to demonstrate that it could also be derived from the Kalecki-Steindl
ramework, if investment was assumed to respond to the profit share instead of the profit rate.5 Similarly, Blecker
1989) showed that the inverse relationship could also come about if the effect of international competition on the
ark-up was taken into consideration. Bhaduri and Marglin (1990: 184) were explicit about the politics behind their
rgument:
“The social democrats and their academic allies, the Left Keynesians, put forward the political and intellectual
case for the view that high capacity utilization would resolve the contradiction between high wages and high
profits. Emphasizing the demand side, neglecting the cost side, they believed that high wages would contribute
not only to high levels of output and employment but also to high levels of profits and accumulation. (.  .  .) the
co-operative interpretation of Keynes became increasingly inconsistent with facts.”
Their formulation, thus, included two cases: one with the positive relation between the wage share and aggregate
emand and the other with a negative relation.6 They called the former the “stagnationist” case, following Taylor, and
amed the latter the “exhilarationist” one. At this point, these terms were not at all illuminating. In a survey from 2002,
obert Blecker (2002: 148, fn. 17) felt he had to clarify that “a stagnationist economy need not actually be stagnant.
tagnationism is simply the case of wage-led aggregate demand, in which an increased profit share depresses aggregate
emand, but an increased wage share boosts it.” The phrases slowly fell out of favor and currently the most common
esignation for the two cases is simply wage-led and profit-led demand.
With Bhaduri, Marglin and Blecker, then, the theoretical impulse that began with Steindl was able to leave behind the
tagnationist stance and transform itself into a more comprehensive framework to examine the interactions between
7emand and distribution in a capitalist economy. This development might be understood, following Marglin and
haduri (1990: 155), by resorting to the “distinction between a theory  of a capitalist economy in which aggregate
emand plays a central role, and models  built on particular assumptions about the components of aggregate demand.”
4 According to some of these models, not only growth and redistribution were compatible, but also both classes could benefit from redistribution,
iven that an increase in the wage share, through its effect on capacity utilization, could raise the profit rate. This case was called the cooperative
age-led demand regime. The models also allowed for the conflictive case, however. See Bhaduri and Marglin (1990: 388–390) and Blecker (2002:
able 8.1) for this taxonomy.
5 Formally, Bhaduri and Marglin’s (1990: 380) investment function can be represented as gi = h(π,u), in which π and u denote, respectively, the
rofit share and the utilization ratio. Dutt’s (1984: 28) investment function, in its turn, can be represented as gi = α + βr + γu = α + βπu + γu, in which
 stands for the profit rate, which is equal to the profit share multiplied by the output-capital ratio and, if the latter is used as a proxy for the utilization
atio, can be represented as πu.
6 In fact, the taxonomy can be extended to distinguish between conflictive and cooperative cases of both wage-led and profit-led demand regimes.
nother distinction that has been made is the one between wage-led and profit-led accumulation. See Bhaduri and Marglin (1990: 388–390) and
lecker (2002: Table 8.1).
7 Paulo dos Santos (2015: 663) has recently provided a negative assessment of the theoretical development from Steindl to the Kaleckian models,
onsidering the work of the former as one among many “integrated theorizations of the secular development of capitalism, and the endogenous
ontradictions it may face”, whereas the latter are called “more partial discussions.” The contrasting positive assessment offered above assumes that
he Kaleckian models should not be considered in isolation, but could lead to more sophisticated theorizations of the development of capitalism if
hey are combined with a historical diagnosis of the latter. The collective book edited by Marglin and Schor (1990), combining history and theory,
an be read along these lines. As Marglin (1990: 3) puts it in his introduction: “the historical chapters set the stage for and frame the theoretical
hapters, and the theory illuminates and focuses history.”
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And they apply this distinction to the literature in question: “we view the Keynesian insistence on aggregate demand
as an important ingredient to understanding how modern capitalism works quite generally, but the stagnationist model
as very much bound to particular places and times.”8
A simple formal representation of the Kaleckian models might be useful to the present argument.9 Following
Michalis Nikiforos and Duncan Foley (2012: 202–204), the demand schedule is derived from the equivalence between
aggregate investment and aggregate savings, considering both to be functions of income distribution and of the level
of capacity utilization, u:
I(ψ,  u) =  S(ψ,  u) (1)
where ψ  is the wage share of income. By assumption, Iψ is negative (the subscript refers to the partial derivative),
assuming that investment is a positive function of the profit share, and Iu is positive, representing an accelerator
effect. Sψ, in its turn, is assumed to be negative, given the assumption that capitalists have a higher propensity to
save than workers, and Su is positive (higher utilization results in higher incomes, which increases aggregate savings
given constant saving propensities). From this equilibrium, it is straightforward to define the impact of a change in
distribution on the level of utilization:
du
dψ
= −Iψ +  Sψ
Iu −  Su (2)
The denominator of (2) is usually considered to be negative, supposing that saving responds more strongly than
investment to changes in utilization. This assumption is named the Keynesian stability condition. The demand regime,
then, depends on the sign of the numerator. If an increase in the wage share reduces savings more than it reduces
investment, the numerator will be negative and demand will be wage-led (that is, du/dψ  > 0). In the opposite case, with
a positive numerator, aggregate demand will be profit-led. This is a very simple framework and numerous extensions
have been suggested, which incorporate taxation, household credit, open economy considerations, technical change,
personal income inequality, among other things (see the summaries provided by Blecker, 2002; Lavoie, 2014: chaps.
5–7).
From the beginning, the demand schedule was examined in conjunction with what is now called the distributive
schedule, that is, the impact of utilization on distribution, dψ/du  (Nikiforos and Foley, 2012: 204–207; Taylor, 2004:
chap. 7). Dutt’s (1984) original contribution, for instance, interpreted the distributive schedule as a result of the
impact of growth on the industrial structure and, through this channel, on the mark-up. In this case, there was explicit
consideration about the time horizon of each adjustment, the commodity market represented by the demand schedule
reaching equilibrium quickly and the industrial structure (represented by the distributive schedule) changing slowly.
Alternatively, the distributive schedule could be interpreted as determined by the labor market, in line with Goodwin’s
(1967) formalization of Marx’s argument, for instance (different interpretations of the distributive schedule are discussed
in Nikiforos and Foley, 2012: 204–207). For the purposes of the present paper, that is, the comparison between the
Kaleckian and the Latin American literatures, it is convenient to avoid the issue of distinct time horizons and to keep in
mind that the distributive schedule can represent different theoretical formulations about the dynamic of the functional
distribution of income.
Before moving to the Latin American episode, it is important to mention a relatively unknown extension of the
Kaleckian framework that is particularly relevant to the present argument. It consists in an attempt by Taylor (1983:
170–176, 1989) to examine the Kaleckian results in a two-sector model, separating the production of wage-goods, on
the one hand, and of luxury- and capital-goods, on the other.10 He assumes a common wage for both sectors, zero saving
by the workers and no consumption of wage-goods by capitalists. Workers, in their turn, consume both wage- and
luxury-goods. Interestingly, the impact of an exogenous shift of demand towards wage-goods on income distribution
and growth depend on which sector is more labor intensive and on the sectoral profit-rate-elasticity of investment. If,
8 A referee suggested that an alternative way to interpret this development would be distinguishing between Steindl’s story of stagnation and the
Kaleckian theory of growth and distribution, with its many different models. In my view, these two sets of distinctions can complement each other.
9 The option of resorting to Nikiforos and Foley’s (2012) version of the framework is justified by its simplicity and generality, despite the fact
that, by putting the demand and the distributive schedules together, it distances itself from the original contributions to this literature, which tended
to assume that demand adjusts more rapidly than distribution.
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or instance, the sector producing wage-goods were more labor-intensive (what is “by no means obvious empirically”,
ccording to Taylor, 1989: 632), a shift of demand towards it would shift income distribution towards wages, both in
he short run and in the steady state. But this would come at the cost of a lower steady-state growth rate, if the response
f the other sector’s investment to its profit rate were higher. A demand shift towards wage-goods would only improve
istribution and, at the same time, accelerate growth if the sector producing wage-goods were more labor-intensive
nd its investment responded more strongly to its profit rate than the other sector’s investment responded to its profit
ate.
This model shows that, by incorporating structural heterogeneity, one can add another dimension to the relation
etween growth and distribution. The shift in demand composition can be interpreted as a shift in the distributive
chedule,11 indicating that composition effects can be important to explain the dynamics of the aggregate labor market
r of the aggregate industrial structure that underlie the trajectory of the functional income distribution. In the case
t hand, supposing that the sector producing wage-goods is more labor intensive, a shift in demand towards it results
n a lower average mark-up, entirely due to the change in the sectoral composition of output. It is precisely these
omposition effects that will play a leading role in the Latin American literature, to which we now turn.
.  From  estancamiento  to  the  unequalizing  spiral:  the  Latin  American  version
The concern about stagnation arrived in Latin America about a decade and half after it thrived in the rich countries.
he context was a bit different. The aftermath of the war was characterized by bold attempts to accelerate development
hrough industrialization in many Latin American countries. It was a period of rich experimentation with development
olicies, while at the same time the field of development economics attained centrality in academia. In Arndt’s (1987:
4) words, development economics was “promoted (.  .  .) from the most neglected to the most written-about branch of
he discipline” and an important part of it was being formulated within Latin America, by the intellectuals gathered
round the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC or, for the locals,
EPAL).
This euphoria lasted only until the mid-1960s, when these countries caught up with the fears (if not with the per
apita income) of its richer counterparts. In 1968, Albert Hirschman claimed there was considerable “disenchantment”
ith industrialization in Latin America. Prominently among the disenchanted was Celso Furtado (1965), the Brazilian
conomist who had been a major contributor to the development literature and who had at the same time been actively
ngaged in policy-making in Brazil. The timing of the gloomy prospects is ironic, as it had been with Steindl’s. Brazil
ould go through, from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, what has been called its “milagre  econômico” (economic
iracle), a period of very high rates of growth, even if also characterized by rapidly increasing inequality and violent
olitical repression.
Hirschman (1981: 20–22) would later interpret this stagnationism in political and psychological terms. The 1960s
ere characterized by a series of “political disasters”, as he calls them, in Latin America, which shattered the hopes
f “a groups of social scientists, who, after all, had taken up the cultivation of development economics in the wake
f World War II not as narrow specialists, but impelled by the vision of a better world.” (1981: 20) Furtado himself
as a victim of one of these “political disasters,” being forced into exile by the Brazilian civil-military dictatorship,
fter the 1964 coup. Hirschman (1981: 21–22) goes on: “In a Freudian act of displacement, they [the development
conomists] ‘took out’ their distress over the political side on the weaker aspects of the economic record. (.  .  .) Now that
olitical developments had takes a resoundingly wrong turn, one had to prove that the economic story was similarly
nattractive.” A positive consequence of this change of mood was to stimulate a more critical look at the process of
evelopment, examining for instance its impact on inequality.12 But it also led to a forecast of stagnation that would
urn out to be incorrect.
11 The model has a parameter that allows it to incorporate this shift in a way that does not impact aggregate demand, in order to distinguish between
hifts in the distributive schedule and shifts in the demand schedule.
12 For the Brazilian controversy on the causes of increasing inequality during that period, see the papers published in the volume edited by Tolipan
nd Tinelli (1975). For a summary in English, see Bacha and Taylor (1978).
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Furtado’s (1965) version of stagnationism was a historically-informed interpretation of capitalist development in
Latin America.13 Its starting point was the existence of a large subsistence economy that acted as a reservoir of labor
for the capitalist sector. The development of the latter would be shaped by a supply of labor that was virtually unlimited,
which kept constant the real wage paid by capitalist firms, at a level just above the living standards allowed by the
subsistence economy.14 This feature entailed a polarization of the consumption market, characterized, on the one side,
by a growing contingent of workers receiving low wages and enjoying a stagnant living standard and, on the other, by
a small elite with rapidly increasing income (mostly appropriated as profits in the capitalist sector) and increasingly
diversified consumption patterns. In other words, development was accompanied by high and increasing inequality. In
this way, the dualism of the economy, divided between subsistence and capitalist sectors, was reflected in a dualism of
the consumption market. And in Furtado’s (1965: 166) words, “the concept of underdevelopment is related to the idea
of structural dualism.”
Furtado examines the impact of these features on the process of development by dividing it into three phases, in an
admittedly schematic periodization of Latin American economic history (see Furtado and Maneschi, 1968: 6–7). The
first one, which lasted from the last quarter of the 19th century until the Great Depression, was marked by high rates of
growth of the exports of primary goods. The second resulted from the sudden reduction of the world demand for these
products and the ensuing deterioration of the terms of trade, which led to import-substitution industrialization focused
primarily on the development of a sector for producing nondurable consumption goods. The third phase, in its turn,
represents a shift of focus of industrialization towards capital-intensive sectors, such as the production of durable and
capital goods.
The polarization of the consumption market mentioned above contributes to bringing about the transition from the
second to the third phase. Given the stagnant incomes of the majority of the workers employed in the capitalist sector
the scope for the expansion of the nondurable goods industry is relatively limited. At the same time, the increasing
incomes of the rich create a growing demand for luxury goods, such as durable ones. This shift, in Furtado’s reading,
results in a reduction of the output-capital ratio, given that the choice of technique in underdeveloped countries is
quite limited and is not influenced by the relative scarcity of the factors of production. In spite of the unlimited supply
of labor, capital-intensive techniques characterize the production of durable and capital goods simply because this is
the only technology available for their production, a technology imported from the developed countries. When these
products were originally created in the developed countries, the technology used in their production reflected the fact
that there was no longer abundance of labor in them (Furtado, 1975: 281–283).
It is against this background, of the interactions between structural dualism, income distribution, consumption
patterns, and the productive structure, that Furtado analyzes the tendency towards stagnation. His view of the growth
process, though nuanced, is a supply-led one, in contrast to Kalecki’s and Steindl’s demand-led view.15 So the first
question regards the availability of savings. An increasing inequality could be expected to give rise to larger savings,
accelerating growth, since the rich tend to have lower propensities to consume than the poor. According to him, this did
not happen in Latin America, however, especially because the elites tended to imitate the consumption pattern of the
elites of the rich countries.16 He generally reasoned, then, assuming a constant saving rate, despite rising inequality.17If the supply of savings was considered constant, what could explain a deceleration of growth? With accumulation
defined as gI =  I/K  =  s/v, in which I, K, s  and v  denote, respectively, investment, capital stock, saving rate and the
capital-output ratio, it is clear that, given a constant saving rate, slower accumulation can only come from a higher
13 The following brief reconstruction of Furtado’s argument will be based mainly on Furtado (1965), Furtado and Maneschi (1968), and Furtado
(1975: esp. chap. 21). See also Furtado (1966), where a Portuguese version of Furtado (1965) can be found together with a broader argument. It is
true that Furtado’s thought went through some changes between 1965 and 1975, but here the focus will be on its continuities. An analysis of the
changes, in light of the contemporary debate and the actual development of capitalism in Brazil, would be a fruitful theme for future research.
14 The identification of surplus labor as one of the main characteristics of underdeveloped countries was widespread in the literature of the time.
Its effects were more comprehensively explored in the work of Lewis (1954, 1958). See also Hirschman (1981: 7–10).
15 See Serrano (2001: 139–142) and Bastos and D’Avila (2009). It is noteworthy that Kalecki (1968/1980) himself thought his demand-led
understanding of growth was applicable only to developed countries and that the underdeveloped ones faced supply constraints. See also Dutt
(2013).
16 This was a widely held view among the early development economists. See, for instance, Nurkse (1953: chap. 3), who explained it by resorting
to Duesenberry’s “demonstration effect,” and Furtado (1952: 21–27), for a comment on Nurkse’s argument.
17 Another reason was that scarce investment opportunities tended to depress the propensity to save (Furtado, 1975: 282–283). In his words, the












































iF. Rugitsky / EconomiA 17 (2016) 265–278 271
apital-output ratio (that is, higher capital intensity). Furtado explained it as a consequence of a cumulative process that
inked increasing inequality to increasing capital intensity: “a higher amount of capital per unit of employment means
 more unequal distribution of income, if the wage is maintained stable.” (1965: 171) This more unequal distribution
f income reinforces the process of increasing capital intensity, by shifting demand towards luxury goods and, thus,
ushing forward the capital deepening. The labor market dualism, thus, guaranteed that capital accumulation would
e accompanied by increasing inequality and a deepening of the dualism of the consumption market. The latter, in
ts turn, would accelerate the shift towards capital-intensive sectors, which would further increase inequality and the
onsumption dualism itself. This cumulative process had, concretely, two effects on growth (1965: 171).
First, it reduced the capacity of the development process to absorb labor from the subsistence sector and, in this way,
o transform the economic structure and enlarge the consumption market. He referred to that effect as a reduction of the
mployment multiplier of the growth process (1975: 283–289). It had, in its turn, the effect of reducing the stimulus for
nvestment in the agricultural and nondurable goods sectors that sold its production to the low-wage workers, which
ould otherwise attenuate the tendency towards capital deepening. Second, the high capital-output ratios in the growing
ectors meant increasing inefficiency of production, given that the limited size of the market entailed low levels of
apacity utilization and the impossibility to reap the benefits of scale economies, with the result that v grew faster than
hat could be explained by technological requirements (1965: 170). A related consequence was a demand leakage and
 greater rigidity of the current account, given that the import content of the durable and capital goods sectors were
igher than average and that some of the consumption demand of the rich was met directly by imports. Briefly put,
urtado’s stagnationist argument related the cumulative process between inequality and rising capital-output ratio to a
eceleration of structural change, rising inefficiency and a more binding foreign exchange constraint.
A few years later, in the beginning of the milagre, this view became increasingly untenable and started to be
uestioned. Probably the most famous critique of Furtado’s stagnationism was provided by Maria da Conceic¸ão Tavares
nd José Serra (1971/1976) in an essay titled “Além  da  estagnac¸ão” (Beyond stagnation).18 They deal specially with
he specifics of Brazilian capitalist development in the period, but two theoretical points they make are important to the
resent argument.19 First, they question Furtado’s claim that inequality led to inadequate markets for durable goods.
ccording to them, the dimension of the market is determined by the size of the “economic surplus,” not by the number
f people that are part of it (1971/1976: 158). Consequently, in contrast to his interpretation, they interpret capacity
tilization in the sector producing durable goods as a cyclical variable, not as a structural consequence of minimum
cales of production. In this way, demand plays a role in their view, by influencing capacity utilization and, through it,
he capital-output ratio and investment. Second, they read Furtado’s argument about the rising capital-output ratio as
mplying a decreasing surplus available for reinvestment, but claim that, given that the rate of profit can be decomposed
s the output-capital ratio times the profit share, a fall of the former can be more than compensated by a rise in the
atter, resulting in the end in an increasing surplus that could be reinvested.20,21
In this way, if for Furtado (1975: 289–291) the way out of stagnation entailed a deep structural transformation in
he distribution of income, the consumption pattern, and the productive structure, for Tavares and Serra (1971/1976:
68–169) capitalist growth could be sustained simply by increasing inequality a little (incorporating a small segment of
he upper middle classes in the consumption market of durable goods) and by compensating the falling output-capital
18 Bresser-Pereira (1970) proposed, contemporaneously, a similar criticism of Furtado. Tavares and Serra’s criticism is especially significant for
he purposes of the present argument, because it bridges Furtado’s analysis and Taylor and Bacha’s model. But it is important to note that, in the
arly 1970s, Furtado’s work in particular and Latin American structuralism in general were criticized from numerous perspectives. Two renowned
xamples, from the Left, are Cardoso and Faletto’s (1971/1979) dependency theory and Oliveira’s (1972/2003) work.
19 Analyses of the debate between Furtado and Tavares and Serra can be found in Serrano (2001: 139–149), Scherer (2007: chap. 2), and Bastos
nd D’Avila (2009). See also Lustig (1980).
20 Their interpretation of Furtado’s argument can be clarified in terms of the famous Cambridge equation (with causality interpreted from savings
o investment, respecting his view), which relates accumulation to the propensity to save and to the profit rate. It is, in fact, an adaptation of the
quation mentioned above, which assumes no savings out of wages, only out of profits. Given a constant propensity to save (Furtado’s assumption),
 falling profit rate (explained by a falling output-capital ratio) would lead to decreasing capital accumulation. Tavares and Serra’s criticism is a bit
omplicated, because they not only question the necessary parallelism between the profit rate and the output-capital ratio by taking into consideration
he rate of surplus value, but also hint at a demand-led understanding of growth (see, for instance, 1971/1976: 167). See Bastos and d’Avila (2009).
21 The decomposition of the profit rate mentioned can be represented in the following way: r = (Y/K)(Π/Y), where r is the profit rate, Y is output,
 is the capital stock, and Π is the mass of profits. They express the profit share in terms of the rate of surplus value, m: Π/Y = m/(m + 1). So, an
ncrease in the rate of surplus value is equivalent to an increase in the profit share. See Tavares and Serra (1971/1976: 163–164, fn. 6).
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ratio with an increasing profit share. The milagre  was plausibly made possible in this precise way. Recent estimates by
Marquetti, Maldonado Filho and Lautert (2010: 492) show that after falling continuously during the 1950s and early
1960s, the profit rate bottoms out in 1964, stabilizes until the late 1960s and rises sharply thereafter, reaching its peak
in the early 1970s. This trajectory, in its turn, is mostly explained by the trajectory of the profit share, which falls from
the early 1960s until the mid-1960s and then recovers until the mid-1970s.22
The nature of both Furtado’s stagnationism and Tavares and Serra’s critique of it is of diagnoses of capitalist
development in Brazil. In the parallelism that is being suggested presently, they are somewhat equivalent to Steindl’s
work. The move towards more general models, relatively independent of specific contexts, was made by Taylor and
Bacha (1976). Their model represents for the Latin American story a transition similar to the one Rowthorn’s (1981),
Dutt’s (1984), and Taylor’s (1985) models represented to the Kaleckian thread, with the caveat that in the latter the
1980s’ literature could build on the formalizations that Kalecki and Steindl had themselves proposed, whereas Taylor
and Bacha attempted to represent with a formal model a literature that was done with almost no mathematics.23
In the Kaleckian episode, the interaction between demand and distribution that was the basis of Steindl’s work is
decoupled from his interpretation of the United States’ capitalism and presented in a more general form. Similarly,
Taylor and Bacha picked up from Furtado and from Tavares and Serra the analysis of the interaction between distribution,
consumption patterns, and structural change, leaving aside their dispute about the trajectory of the Brazilian economy
from the 1960s until the early 1970s. It is noteworthy that Taylor and Bacha’s model is a demand-led one, as the
Kaleckians’ models and Tavares and Serra’s theory, but in contrast to Furtado supply-led theory. Be that as it may,
referring precisely to Furtado and to Tavares, they explain their aim: “Following the lead of a number of Latin American
institutional analyses, we set up our model in classical form, stressing the role of distributional trends in shaping the
growth process” (1976: 199).
Roughly put, their model suggests a cumulative process in which accumulation increases inequality, on the one
hand, and growing inequality stimulates accumulation, on the other.24 It is possible to represent it beginning with the
macroeconomic equilibrium between investment and savings, as was done with the Kaleckian one, in the previous
section. Assuming that profits are entirely saved, that unskilled workers consume all their income and that skilled
workers save a constant fraction of theirs, aggregate savings are determined by the level of profits and by total wages
paid to skilled workers. They claim that this “amounts to a saving-investment balance in Kaleckian form” (1976: 206).
They further assume a fixed short-run supply of capital and that profits are constant, determined by technical
coefficients.25 Thus, an increase in investment is balanced entirely by an increase in the number of skilled laborers.
Given the fixed wage assumed (a constant multiple of the wage of the unskilled workers, which is, in its turn, determined
by living standards in the subsistence economy, along the lines of dual-economy models), a growing number of skilled
workers results in a higher amount of total wages paid to them and, thus, in higher savings. (At the same time, the
higher number of skilled workers, given the fixed coefficients of production assumed and a fixed capital stock, result
in a higher share of wages going to skilled workers. This is what the model means by increasing inequality: higher
wage inequality.)
22
“The profit share stabilized with the military rule when pro-capital reforms and economic policies were implemented, and it rose during the
1968–1973 economic boom. The military dictatorship ended job tenure in the private sector, introduced a new wage policy that restricted wage
increases, and removed the restriction to profit remittances” (Marquetti et al., 2010: 493). It might be useful to clarify that this interpretation of the
milagre can be reconciled both with a supply-led and a demand-led understanding of growth. In the latter case, a rising profit rate was not only the
result of a higher profit share, but also of the increase in capacity utilization generated by an adaptation of the consumption pattern to the productive
structure through increasing inequality. Financial reforms that increased autonomous demand (allowing rising credit flows) also contributed to
increasing utilization. Bastos and D’Avila (2009: 185–187) interpret the milagre along these lines and suggest that this is also Tavares and Serra’s
(1971/1976) interpretation.
23 The fact that Taylor plays a role in both episodes may reinforce the case for the parallelism suggested.
24 An interesting question for future research concerns the methodological divergence between the two episodes here discussed. Whereas the
Kaleckian thread resorts more commonly to steady state analyses, the Latin American version tends to use cumulative processes. The reason behind
this divergence might be found by following the hint suggested by Taylor and Bacha (1976: 209): “Most growth theory is ill-adapted to analysis of
Belindia because it deals with steady states; whereas the topic of interest is a secular shift of production and employment patterns within the modern
sector.”
25
“[I]n a competitive economy, there is only one degree of freedom for trade-offs between the real wage and the rate of profit along the wage-profit
frontier. The surplus labor fixed real wage in the modern sector thus determines both the rate of profit and the choice of technique. As long as the
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Taylor (1989: 624) would later refer to this model as “neo-Keynesian,” because it assumes that the economy operates
t full capacity and that the adjustment, as mentioned, is brought about entirely by the number of skilled workers.26
he effect of investment on the level of skilled workers can be explained by two kinds of mechanisms, one related to
arket mechanisms, the other, to social institutions. They explain the first thus:
“Imagine that investment demand increases and is met, if necessary, by governmental diversion of resources to
capital goods production (.  . .). Then the cost of capital to industries producing consumer goods will rise, and
the cost of labor will fall. But because unskilled workers have a stable real wage, the skilled wage will bear the
brunt of the adjustment with a consequent shift in the skill mix toward higher wage employees. As a result, more
skilled jobs will open up in the substitution response to increased capital scarcity.” (1976: 206)
And the second is explained in the following way:
“Given a repressed, inactive labor movement and strong social desires for upward mobility, it is easier to cut
back blue-collar than white-collar jobs in the short run, particularly if some blue-collar employment reductions
really take the form of upgrading to middle-class positions. On the supply side it is also true that increases in
capital and luxury goods production levels will be related, since both subsectors are in the ‘advanced’ part of
the economy and their entrepreneurs make investment decisions in the same expectational milieu. Once again,
capital shortages will hold back expansion in more traditional wage goods industries, and poor workers facing
escalating relative prices or elongated queues are always welcome to disappear back into the subsistence sector.
(. .  .) the substitution effect again works in favor of skilled employment increases.” (1976: 206–207)
The other side of the cumulative process is the effect of the skilled worker’s wage bill on investment (1976: 209–211).
hey justify this assumption claiming that it is a plausible simplification to “assume that investors look only to the
eading sector of the economy” (210). Assuming, in addition, that the “leading sector” is the production of luxury
oods, they define the growth of capital as a function of the growth of luxury goods’ sales multiplied by a term that
epresents entrepreneurial expectations.27 Moreover, given that, by assumption, unskilled workers consume only wage
oods and skilled workers consume only luxury goods, the interaction between inequality and investment can be easily
dentified. Thus, the equivalence between aggregate investment and aggregate savings could be represented formally
n the following way:
I(α) =  S(α),  (3)
here α  is the share of skilled workers wages in the total wage bill, an indicator of inequality in the context of the
odel. Rising investment, as noted, increases the share of skilled workers on the total wage bill, pushing the demand
or luxury goods up, stimulating thus a further growth of investment, which, in its turn, raises inequality even more.
t is interesting to note that, like Tavares and Serra and in contrast to Furtado, Taylor and Bacha (1976) formulate
 demand-led growth model that results in a positive relation between inequality and aggregate demand, a relation
xplained by their assumption about the determinants of investment.
Following Taylor and Bacha (1976), de Janvry and Sadoulet (1983) formulated a more general model that can
esult both in the mentioned cumulative process between growth and inequality or in its opposite, a cumulative process
etween growth and increasing equality.28 They refer to the two cases, respectively, as social disarticulation and social
rticulation. By taking this step of generalizing Taylor and Bacha’s (1976) result, they’ve done for the Latin American
iterature something similar to what Bhaduri, Marglin and Blecker did for the Kaleckian one. An important difference
s that, in the Kaleckian case, the profit-led result was derived by making small changes in the baseline model, while de
anvry and Sadoulet (1983) present a model that, despite its reference to Taylor and Bacha’s (1976), is a big departure
26 See Dutt (1990b: 925).
27
“Since modern corporations are specialized in mass production of just the goods that consumers in the rapidly growing upper strata of the
ncome distribution prefer, there is every reason to think that the growth process is centered on the interaction between escalating demand for newly
ppearing ‘luxuries’ by the ‘rich’ (. . .) and investment responding to increasing sales on the part of corporations producing these goods.” (Taylor
nd Bacha, 1976: 198)
28 De Janvry and Sadoulet’s (1983) model is interesting for the present narrative because it completes the parallelism suggested, in spite of its
uestionable assumptions. On these, see Rattso (1986) and Dutt (1990b: 925–926).
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Table 1
Varieties of growth and distribution models.
Demand schedule
Wage-led (du/dψ>0) Profit-led (du/dψ<0)
or savings-driven
Distributive schedule
Wage-squeeze (dψ/du < 0) (1) Stable (2) Unstable





Skilled-labor-biased-growth (5) Stable (6) Unstable
Unskilled-labor-biased-growth (7) Unstable (8) StableTop: Taylor (2010: 188); Bottom: Author’s formulation.
from it. They go back, for instance, to the savings-constrained theory of Furtado, abandoning the demand-led closure
shared by Tavares and Serra (1971/1976) and Taylor and Bacha (1976).
Focusing on the interactions between inequality, consumption pattern, and productive structure, they identify the
conditions that lead to either social articulation or disarticulation. According to them, these conditions are essentially
related to the key growth sectors (in terms of the share of total capital accumulation that each of them concentrate) and
the level of inequality. High levels of inequality and capital accumulation concentrated in the sectors producing goods
demanded by the richest segments of the population lead, like in Taylor and Bacha, to social disarticulation.
They distinguish between social articulation and disarticulation by the role performed by wages. In their view,
social articulation is a process in which “wages create the bulk of final demand for all sectors of the economy. (.  . .)
Growth and income distribution are, thus, indissolubly tied together in an ultimately progressive manner even if the
nature of this relation is marked by serious class confrontations and recurrent economic cycles and crises.” (1983:
279) Interestingly, they attribute the explanation of such a process to Marx and to Kalecki (1983: 279). It is indeed a
description of what the Kaleckian literature would call a wage-led demand regime, taking into consideration sectoral
diversity. In social disarticulation, however, wages are only “a cost to capital”, given that “[n]on-workers incomes
create both the source of savings and the expanding final demand for the key growth sectors.” (1983: 279) Finally,
their paper provides not only the mentioned generalization of Taylor and Bacha’s (1976) result, albeit resorting to a
different closure, but also a description of Brazilian development from 1968 to 1977, arguing that it represented an
instance of social disarticulation, an interpretation of the period not unlike Tavares and Serra’s (1971/1976).
3.  Varieties  of  growth  and  distribution  models
The parallelism between the two literatures and the numerous affinities between them may suggest the fruitfulness
of greater interaction. A more analytical classification of them, as the one indicated in Table 1, above, can serve as
a starting point for examining it more concretely. The top part of the table, due to Taylor (2010: 188), is simply a
systematization of the Kaleckian framework briefly described in section 1, above.29 By putting together the potential
combinations of demand and distributive schedules, with positive or negative slopes in the (ψ, u) plane, it presents four
possible growth and distribution models. The stability analysis allows one to investigate the possibility of cycles and
the different models might also serve to compare, in each of them, the impact of different economic policies, going
beyond the more restrictive comparison between different demand regimes.30 Moreover, by introducing a variety of
models, the systematization broadens the scope of the framework, allowing it to be flexible to different historical,
institutional and political contexts. It is plausible that, given different labor legislations and industrial structures, some
29 See also Taylor (2004: chapter 7) and Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006).
30 The stability analysis reported in the table is a simplification. For more precise discussions of the issue, which is beyond the scope of the present
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conomies might present, for instance, a procyclical wage share, while others present an anticyclical one. Those two
ases are represented, respectively, by the profit-squeeze distributive schedule and the wage-squeeze one.
It might be useful to mention, to make the varieties more concrete, that Barbosa-Filho and Taylor’s (2006) structuralist
oodwin model is a profit-led, profit-squeeze one, that is, variety (4) of the table, although they also discuss variety
2).31 Dutt’s (1984) original model, in its turn, could be roughly classified as a wage-led, profit-squeeze one, model (3),
ith the caveats that, in this case, the demand schedule and the distributive one operate in different time horizons, as
entioned, and that he actually resorts to a nonlinear distributive schedule. This issue of nonlinearity is, by the way, an
mportant limitation of the systematization above, since there is mounting evidence of nonlinear schedules (Nikiforos
nd Foley, 2012).
Moving down to the bottom part of Table 1, one finds four other varieties of growth and distribution models, inspired
y the Latin American literature. Concerning the demand schedule, these models emphasize wage inequality instead
f the functional distribution of income. In fact, Furtado’s and Tavares and Serra’s (1971/1976) work incorporate both
imensions of the distribution of income, but Taylor and Bacha’s (1976) and de Janvry and Sadoulet’s (1983) models
estrict the analysis to the inequality between skilled and unskilled workers and workers and managers, respectively.
iven the very substantial wage inequality observed in most capitalist economies, focusing exclusively on the functional
istribution of income leaves out a potentially important phenomenon. Recently, this limit began to be addressed by
aleckians with the formulation of models that incorporate either wage inequality or the personal distribution of
ncome (Palley, 2014, 2015; Carvalho and Rezai, 2016).32 The Latin American literature could contribute to this
ngoing research.
The distributive schedule that can be extracted from the Latin American episode is a larger departure from the
aleckian one, because it incorporates sectoral heterogeneity. With a few notable exceptions, like Taylor’s (1983:
70-176, 1989) model, the Kaleckian literature is based mostly on single-good models, disregarding issues that can
nly be dealt in multi-sector frameworks.33 As Dutt (1990b: 915) argues, two-sector models are called for when there
s a significant difference between the products of the two sectors. In the Latin American literature, two differences
re emphasized. First, the level of skill required from the workers of each sector. In Taylor and Bacha’s (1976) model,
or instance, the sector that produces wage-goods employs only unskilled workers and the sector that produces luxury-
oods employs only skilled workers. Second, the group that consumes the product of each sector is also different. To
se, again, Taylor and Bacha’s (1976) example, they assume that luxury-goods are consumed only by skilled workers
nd that wage-goods are consumed only by unskilled workers.
As can be easily noted, these two sectoral differences can easily generate cumulative processes. If wage inequality
ncreases, the demand composition shifts towards luxury-goods. This shift, in its turn, tends to increase the share of
uxury-goods in total output and, through the labor market, to increase wage inequality further. This would be the
nequalizing spiral, described by Taylor and Bacha (1976), which corresponds in the table to model (6). De Janvry and
adoulet’s (1983) social articulation case could be roughly classified as model (7), an equality-led, unskilled-labor-
iased-growth one.
That actual capitalist economies are characterized by sectoral heterogeneity in terms of the level of skill required
or production should not be controversial. Nor that this may be a crucial mediation between growth and wage
nequality, much of the change of the latter stemming from composition effects. There is more doubt, however, about
he other source of heterogeneity, that is, demand composition. The evidence available (Wells, 1974, 1977; Lustig,
982; Medeiros, 2015: chap. 2; Carvalho et al., 2016) is ambiguous, some of it suggesting heterogeneity, some of it
uggesting that the composition of demand of different income groups is not different enough to have macroeconomic
mplications.
Taylor’s (1983: 170–176, 1989) model examined above is, interestingly, in-between the Kaleckian and the Latin
merican literatures. It is a two-sector model and it also has different income groups consuming the products of
31 Goodwin’s (1967) own model is a bit different, since it relates the wage share and employment (instead of capacity utilization), but it could be
oughly classified as a savings-driven, profit squeeze one, model (4).
32 A hypothesis that could be easily incorporated in Kaleckian models is that the salaries of managers are related, in some way, to the profit share.
his argument, put forward by Bacha (1974/1978) in the Latin American discussion, allows one to connect the functional distribution of income
nd wage inequality.
33 For other Kaleckian two-sector models, see Dutt (1990a: chaps. 6–7), and for a survey of models that incorporate sectoral heterogeneity, see
utt (1990b). For a critique of Kaleckian arguments from the standpoint of a multisectoral framework, see Steedman (1992).
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different sectors. But it does not take into consideration heterogeneous levels of skills between workers, so that the
difference between the two sectors, concerning the production dimension, is their labor productivity and, given a
common wage, their profit share. With this formal structure, a shift in the composition of demand towards luxury- and
investment-goods does not increase wage inequality (which is assumed away) but it raises the profit share, if this sector
is less labor-intensive. In this case, then, a distributive schedule incorporating sectoral heterogeneity is combined with
a demand schedule that depends on the functional distribution of income. This example clarifies that the varieties of
growth and distribution models are not restricted to the eight presented above, but can be extended to combinations of
demand and distributive schedules that combine the two parts of the table.
Some particular historical periods seem to suggest the fruitfulness of the varieties of growth and distribution models
that incorporate sectoral heterogeneity. The interpretation of the Brazilian milagre  econômico  along the lines suggested
by model (6), Taylor and Bacha’s, has already been pointed out. The more recent growth acceleration in Brazil, from
2004 to 2010, might also need a model of this sort in order to be properly understood, although now the dynamics
seem to resemble model (7), the equality-led, unskilled-labor-biased-growth one. Further research is needed to assess
this suggestion, but both falling wage inequality (and a growing wage share) and a shift of the productive structure
towards sectors intensive in unskilled-labor were observed in the period and it is plausible that one development might
have fed the other.34
Models are, of course, abstractions. Their usefulness should be judged by their ability to illuminate particular
historical developments and different models might be more adequate, thus, to interpret different historical periods or
different economies. The interaction suggested between the Kaleckian and the Latin American literatures should be
understood as an attempt to expand the available varieties of models so that the researcher has more options to choose
from.35 The choice should be made based on what seems to be the more salient aspects of the development to be
interpreted and it is plausible that, in some cases, the role of sectoral heterogeneity as a mediation between growth and
distribution will be among them.
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